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The Computer Misuse Act 1990 to support vulnerability research? Proposal for a 
defence for hacking as a strategy in the fight against cybercrime.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite the recent push towards security by design and the progress made in achieving more 
secure IT products, most software and hardware on the market still includes numerous 
vulnerabilities or flaws.1 These weaknesses, when discovered and exploited by criminal 
hackers,2 compromise the security of networked and information systems (systems). They 
affect millions of users, as acknowledged by the UK government in its Cybersecurity 
Strategy launched on 1st November 2016.3 
Conversely, the removal of these weaknesses significantly contributes to the fight 
against cybercrime,4 and, more widely, to the management of digital security and privacy 
risks, as recognised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 
2015.5 In the race to fix vulnerabilities, security researchers are key actors. Through finding 
and timely disclosure of vulnerabilities to vendors who supply or service IT products, they 
help to close the security gap. Nevertheless, when not invited by vendors to hack,6 they face 
                                                
1 In the absence of official definition of vulnerabilities, see the list established by the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) in Good Practice Guide on Vulnerability Disclosure. From challenges to 
recommendations (2015) 14-15 <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/vulnerability-disclosure>, accessed 
20 July 2017.  
2 Nicknamed black hats, criminal hackers act alongside script kiddies who lack programming expertise and 
resort to others’ scripts and tools to hack. Alisdair A. Gillepsie, Cybercrime. Key issues and debates (OUP 
2016) 43-44; Pedro Miguel F. Freitas and Nuno Gonçalves, ‘Illegal access to information systems and the 
Directive 2013/40/EU.’ (2015) 29(1) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 50, 56; David 
Wall, Cybercrime: The transformation of crime in the information age (Polity, 2007), .53-56 
3 UK National Cybersecurity Strategy 20, 22-23, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/564268/national_cyber_security
_strategy.pdf> accessed 20 July 2017. 
4 European Parliament, LIBE, Report on the fight against cybercrime, (2017/2068 (INI), 25 July 2017, para 21, 
34, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-
0272+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>; Benoît Dupont, ‘Bots, cops, and corporations: on the limits of enforcement and 
the promise of polycentric regulation as a way to control large-scale cybercrime’, (2016) Crime Law and Social 
Change 1, 2; Amanda Craig and Scott Shackelford, ‘Hacking the Planet, the Dalai Lama, and You: Managing 
Technical Vulnerabilities in the Internet Through Polycentric Governance’ (2014) 24 Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 381; Michael Levi and Matthew Leighton Williams, ‘Multi-
agency partnerships in cybercrime reduction’ (2013) 21(5) Information Management & Computer Security 420; 
Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell and Jeffrey Haut, ‘Bottoms up: A Comparison of Voluntary Cybersecurity 
Frameworks’ (2015) 16 UC Davis Bus. LJ 217. 
5 OECD, Digital Security Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity: OECD Recommendation and 
Companion Document (OECD, 2015) 14. On the Governments’ use of vulnerabilities to conduct mass 
surveillance: Stefan Schuster, Melle Van Den Berg, Xabier Larrucea, Ton Slewe, and Peter Ide-Kostic, ‘Mass 
surveillance and technological policy options: Improving security of private communications’ (2017) 50 
Computer Standards & Interfaces 76, 79-80; European Parliament, LIBE, ‘Legal Frameworks for Hacking by 
Law Enforcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of Practices’, (2017) PE 583.137, at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583137/IPOL_STU(2017)583137_EN.pdf> 
accessed 20 July 2017; European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Dissemination and use of intrusive 
surveillance technologies, Opinion 8/2015, 6-7 
<https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/
15-12-15_Intrusive_surveillance_EN.pdf> accessed 20 July 2017. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264245471-en accessed 20 July 2017. 
6 The terminology referring to these security researchers is not clear, and therefore will not be used in this 
article. Some consider them to be grey hats because they ask for rewards (Freitas (n 2); C. Kirsch, ‘The Grey 
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significant criminal law challenges. Taking stock of these issues, which remain substantially 
understudied in the UK,7 this paper proposes a new defence of public interest to offences 
under the Computer Misuse Act. 
 
In November 2015 the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) 
concluded that, in the US and the EU, the threat of prosecution under computer misuse 
legislations ‘can have a chilling effect’. 8 Security researchers are ‘discentivise[d]’ to find 
vulnerabilities, especially when working independently without vendors’ prior authorisation. 
They potentially violate hacking laws criminalising unauthorised access to systems, and run 
the risk of being treated like criminal hackers. In the UK, like in other countries,9 the risk has 
already been realised. Two independent security researchers were sentenced for unauthorised 
access to systems under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA).10 Yet, one judge has 
expressed ‘some considerable regret’ in having to find ‘the case proved against’ the 
defendant.11  
 
This paper argues that this challenging situation in the UK results from a conscious 
recommendation in 1989 to criminalise hacking, without exceptions, including when done for 
security purposes.12 This choice needs revisiting so that criminal law can ‘appropriately 
facilitate […] rather than inappropriately obstruct’ security research.13 
Only a handful of law academics, mostly focusing on US federal criminal law, have 
addressed ways to transform criminal law into a supportive tool for independent security 
researchers. They have argued for a ‘safe harbour’ without being clear about whether this 
would take the form of a defence justifying the commission of crime or of an exemption 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hat Hacker: Reconciling Cyberspace Reality and the Law’ (2014) 41(3) New Kentucky Law Review 383), 
because they do not have authorisation (Thomas Wilhem, Professional Penetration Testing (Elsevier, 2013)) or 
because they sell the information to Governments (Marilyn Fidler, ‘Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability 
Trade: A Preliminary Analysis.’ (2015) 11 I/S Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 405, 410-
412); others may consider them as white hats if they act ethically (Trevor A. Thompson, ‘Terrorizing the 
Technological Neighborhood Watch: The Alienation and Deterrence of the White Hats under the CFAA.’ 
(2008) 36 Fla. St. UL Rev. 537). 
7 The only existing analysis of UK criminal law is that of Andrew Cormack, ‘Can CSIRTs Lawfully Scan for 
Vulnerabilities.’ (2014) 11:3 SCRIPTed 308 <http://script-ed.org/?p=1671> accessed 20 July 2017. Gillepsie 
mentions the issue in passing, (n 2). Non-UK authors referred briefly to UK law: Thompson (n 6); Alana 
Maurushat, Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities: Legal and Ethical Issues (Springer 2013) ch 4 
8 ENISA (n 1) 65-66. 
9 For other countries: US v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3rd 525 (3rd Cir. 2014), commented upon in C Kirsch (n 6); 
France, Cour de cassation, Crim. 20 May 2015, Olivier Laurelli, Pourvoi 14-81336, at Legifrance.gov.fr, with 
the first instance case reported in English language by Megan Geuss, ‘French journalist ‘hacks’ govt by 
inputting correct URL, later fined $4,000+’, Ars Technica 09 February 2014, https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/02/french-journalist-fined-4000-plus-for-publishing-public-documents/ ; for other cases, notably in 
New Zealand and the US, Maurushat (n 7) 35-52. 
10 R v Cuthberth (Crown Court, 2005, unreported); John Oates, ‘Tsunami hacker convicted. Fine + costs for 
Daniel Cuthbert’, The Register, 06 October 2005 at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/06/tsunami_hacker_convicted/; Peter Sommer, ‘Two Recent Computer 
Misuse Cases’, (2006) 16/5 Computers & Law January, https://www.pmsommer.com/CLCMA1205.pdf 
accessed 20 July 2017; R v Mangham [2012] EWCA Crim 973; Graham Cluley, ‘Jail for “ethical” hacker who 
bypassed Facebook security from his bedroom’, Sophos, 20 February 2012, at 
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/02/20/jail-facebook-ethical-hacker/ accessed 20 July 2017. 
11 R v Cuthbert, in John Oates (n 10).  
12 ENISA (n 1) 65-66. 
13 ENISA (n 1) 70. 
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whereby no crime would be a priori committed because security researchers would be 
considered authorised to hack.14 
 In contrast, my proposal for a defence for CMA offences clearly shifts the discussion 
away from the controversial question of authorisation, and would provide security 
researchers, when prosecuted, with a mechanism to demonstrate to the courts that, contrary to 
criminal hackers, they have acted in the public interest and proportionately.  
 
This paper will start by explaining why independent security researchers are needed, so as to 
underline how their work contributes to the public interest. After a presentation of the current 
criminal law challenges inherent in the process of vulnerability research, three options for 
tackling these challenges will be explored. First is modifying the structure of the current 
CMA offence of unauthorised access, along the lines explored by the Scottish and English 
Law Commissions in 1987 and 1988. The second option of improving the current CPS 
guidelines would be a first step in the right direction. However, only the third option, a public 
interest defence, would provide a statutory basis for security researchers to argue before the 
courts that their actions were proportionate to the public interest objective they sought to 
achieve. A defence for all CMA offences would allow criminal law to recognise security 
researchers’ fundamental contribution to the disruption of the technical infrastructure on 
which the criminal underground relies.15  
 
 
 
 
1 – The need for vulnerability research and independent security researchers 
 
Vulnerability research is a response to a persistent and ubiquitous lack of security in IT 
systems. Various actors engage in vulnerability research, with independent security 
researchers representing just one of the many groups searching for vulnerabilities. The 
latter’s contribution to vulnerability research should be recognised as essential to a strategy of 
securing products for the benefit of the wider public. 
 
 
1.1 - The persistence of ubiquitous insecurity 
  
The ‘Achilles’ heel of information systems’,16 vulnerabilities can cut across a variety of 
products created by different vendors17. They exist in all types of devices (desktops, laptops, 
                                                
14 Brent Wible, ‘A site where hackers are welcome: Using hack-in contests to shape preferences and deter 
computer crime.’ (2003) 112(6) The Yale Law Journal 1577, 1601-1602, with the exemption only during 
hacking contests; Thompson (n 6) 578-580; Kirsch (n 6) 400-401; outside the US, Maurushat (n 7); without 
discussion of the exemption, Taiwo A Oriola, ‘Bugs for sale: Legal and ethical proprieties of the market in 
software vulnerabilities.’ (2010) 28 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 451, 507. For Germany, Dominik 
Brodowski does not suggest a reform, ‘(Ir-)responsible disclosure of software vulnerabilities and the risk of 
criminal liability’, (2015) Information technology: IT 357. 
15 UK Cybersecurity Strategy (n 3) 20, 22-23; see also, B Dupont (n 4). 
16 Schuster, Van Den Berg, Larrucea, Slewe, and Ide-Kostic (n 5) 79; Kirsch (n 6) 395. 
17 Notably, Antonio Nappa, Richard Johnson, Leyla Bilge, Juan Caballero and Tudor Dumitras, ‘The attack of 
the clones: A study of the impact of shared code on vulnerability patching’, in 2015 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy (SP) 692; Amiangshu Bosu, Jeffrey C. Carver, Munawar Hafiz, Patrick Hilley and Derek 
Janni, ‘Identifying the characteristics of vulnerable code changes: An empirical study’, in Proceedings of the 
22nd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering (ACM 2014) 257, 262; 
Ashish Arora, Chris Forman, Anand Nandkumar and Rahul Telang, ‘Competition and patching of security 
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mobile phones, IoT) and affect all hardware and software: operating systems - whether 
Linux, Apple, Windows or Android, applications, internet protocols, access routers, even 
anti-virus software and firewalls.18 Given that they can remain undiscovered for long periods 
they tend to accumulate over the years, despite increasing efforts to detect and remove 
them.19  
The ever-increasing complexity of software (Windows 7 contains 40 millions lines of 
code), and the emphasis on interoperability to facilitate communications and transfer of data 
between operating systems, impede the ability to design secure products.20 ‘[M]ore attention 
[is paid] to features than to fundamental security’.21 Other factors contribute to insecurity 
being ubiquitous: the Internet not being designed with security in mind,22 and the exponential 
‘growth of societal dependency on globally interconnected technology’.23  
 
 
Since as far back as 1949 functionality bugs and security vulnerabilities have been recognised 
as an unwanted but inevitable outcome of creating software and hardware. 24 They need to be 
found and fixed even after the product has been released onto the market.25 However, 
establishing effective strategies to mitigate the creation of vulnerabilities has remained 
                                                                                                                                                  
vulnerabilities: An empirical analysis’ (2010) 22(2) Information Economics and Policy 164, 166; Kirsch (n 7) 
395. 
18 For an overview, Craig and Shackelford (n 4); Meiring De Villiers, ‘Enabling Technologies of Cyber Crime: 
Why Lawyers Need to Understand It.’ (2011) 11 Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol'y  1, 43; Ravi Sen and Sharad Borle. 
‘Estimating the Contextual Risk of Data Breach: An Empirical Approach’ (2015) 32(2) Journal of Management 
Information Systems 314, 333.  
19 Oriola (n 14) 466; ENISA (n 1) 32-36. 
20 Code is a set of rules or instructions made of numbers, symbols and/or words, and which forms part of a 
programme. Ross Anderson, ‘Why information security is hard-an economic perspective’ in Computer security 
applications conference, 2001. acsac 2001. proceedings 17th annual (IEEE, 2001) 358, 363; Craig and 
Shackelford (n 4) 410; Jay P. Kesan and Carol M. Hayes, ‘Bugs in the Market: Creating a Legitimate, 
Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities’ (2016) 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 753, 787; Oriola 
(n 14) 466. Lessig has used the term in a more general sense, to mean the Internet technical architecture of   
software and hardware, Code 2.0, 2006, <http://codev2.cc/> accessed 20 July 2017. 
21 Bell, author of the influential cybersecurity models of the 1970s and 1980s, David Elliott Bell, ‘Looking back 
at the bell-la padula model’ In Computer Security Applications Conference, 21st Annual (IEEE 2005) 15, para. 
7.2 ; Oriola (n 12) 467 fn 101 and 102 
22 Craig and Shackelford (n 4) 395; Sandra Braman, ‘The framing years: Policy fundamentals in the Internet 
design process, 1969–1979.’ (2011) 27(5) The Information Society 295, 300-302; Yanyan Li and Keyu Jiang, 
‘Prospect for the future internet: A study based on TCP/IP vulnerabilities.’ In Computing, Measurement, 
Control and Sensor Network (CMCSN), 2012 International Conference, IEEE, 2012, 52; Malte Ziewitz and Ian 
Brown, ‘A Prehistory of Internet Governance’, in Ian Brown (ed.), Research Handbook on Governance of the 
Internet (Edward Elgar, 2013) 3.  
23 Rolf H. Weber and Evelyne Studer, ‘Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things: Legal aspects’ (2016) 32(5) 
Computer Law & Security Review 715, 716 
24 In 1949, Wilkes, British computer scientist, recognized that debugging will be part of his job of creating code, 
cited in Craig and Shackelford (n 3) 410; Robert W Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘The law and economics of 
software security’ (2006) 30 Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y 283, 296-297; Oriola (n 14) 465; Jaziar Radianti and Jose J. 
Gonzalez, ‘A preliminary model of the vulnerability black market’, in 25th International System Dynamics 
Conference at Boston, USA 2007, 5 <http://www.academia.edu/download/42408398/RADIA352.pdf> accessed 
20 July 2017. See also, security and cryptography expert, Bruce Schneier, Secrets and lies: digital security in a 
networked world (John Wiley & Sons, 2011) 209-210. 
25 Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, and Susan Landau, ‘Lawful hacking: Using existing 
vulnerabilities for wiretapping on the Internet.’ (2014) 12 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 27, para 67; Nuthan 
Munaiah, Felivel Camilo, Wesley Wigham, Andrew Meneely and Meiyappan Nagappan, ‘Do bugs foreshadow 
vulnerabilities? An in-depth study of the chromium project’ (2016) Empirical Software Engineering 1, 34. 
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challenging. Security by default remains often an after-thought in the design of IT products.26 
Due to insufficient (or a lack of) training and experience in cybersecurity, most software 
developers cannot recognise and avoid creating vulnerabilities.27 To compound the problem, 
internationally recognised technical standards for good quality software have not always 
integrated security as a formal requirement28 and are still on-going.29 Moreover, economic 
incentives for security by design have so far failed to significantly improve the security of IT 
products. Vendors continue to mostly abide by the ‘penetrate [the market] first and patch 
later’ motto.30 Although good security can be part of a marketing strategy to increase brand 
trustworthiness, most vendors continue to consider that ‘the harm as experienced by the 
individual user [because of the security flaw] is […] an externality not borne by the 
vendor’.31 This behaviour, denounced as a threat to security as early as in the late 1960s,32 
runs counter to security by design, which requires time to create and analyse products.33  
To reduce the number of vulnerabilities created, emphasis is put on better software 
hygiene or assurance – i.e. better processes in the designing of products - and closing the gap 
in security skills, as notably acknowledged in the UK Cybersecurity Strategy in November 
2016.  
 
 
                                                
26 Ari Takanen, Petri Vuorijärvi, Marko Laakso and Juha Röning, ‘Agents of responsibility in software 
vulnerability processes’ (2004) 6(2) Ethics and Information Technology 93, 108; Daniel Hein and Hossein 
Saiedian, ‘Secure software engineering: Learning from the past to address future challenges’ (2009) 18(1) 
Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective 8, 11; Karina Curcio, Andreia Malucelli, Sheila Reinehr 
and Marco Antônio Paludo, ‘An analysis of the factors determining software product quality: A comparative 
study.’ (2016) 48 Computer Standards & Interfaces 10; Nabil M. Mohammed, Mahmood Niazi, Mohammad 
Alshayeb and Sajjad Mahmood, ‘Exploring software security approaches in software development lifecycle: A 
systematic mapping study’ (2017) 50 Computer Standards & Interfaces 107, 113. 
27 Malik Aleem Ahmed and Jeroen van den Hoven, ‘Agents of responsibility—freelance web developers in web 
applications development’ (2010) 12(4) Information Systems Frontiers 415; Andrew Austin and Laurie 
Williams, ‘One technique is not enough: A comparison of vulnerability discovery techniques’, in 2011 
International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement (IEEE 2011) 97; Bosu, Carver, 
Hafiz, Hilley and Janni (n 17) 264, 265; Muhammad Adnan, Mike Just, Lynne Baillie, Hilmi Gunes 
Kayacik,’Investigating the work practices of network security professionals’ (2015) 23(3) Information & 
Computer Security 347.  
28 Rahul Telang and Sunil Wattal, ‘An empirical analysis of the impact of software vulnerability announcements 
on firm stock price’ (2007) 33(8) IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 544, 545; Sanjay Bahl and O.P. 
Wali, ‘Perceived significance of information security governance to predict the information security service 
quality in software service industry’ (2014) 22(1) Information Management & Computer Security 2. 
29 As acknowledged in its draft Recital 9 of the future Directive 2013/40/EU, by Rapporteur Monika Hohlmeier, 
for the EU Parliament, Draft Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on attacks against information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, 
2010/0273 (COD), 24 November 2011, ‘Brian Henderson-Sellers, Cesar Gonzalez-Perez, Tom Mcbride and 
Graham Low, ‘An ontology for ISO software engineering standards: 1) Creating the infrastructure’ (2014) 36(3) 
Computer Standards & Interfaces 563; Richard Kemp, ‘ISO 27018 and personal information in the cloud: First 
year scorecard’ (2015) 31(4) Computer Law & Security Review 553. 
30 Rainer Böhme, ‘Vulnerability Markets. What Is the Economic Value of a Zero-day Exploit?’ Paper Held at 
the 2005 Chaos Communication Congress Berlin, Germany. 2005, in 22C3: Private Investigations. Chaos 
Computer Club, Berlin, Germany, 2005, 1; Ashish Arora, Jonathan P. Caulkins and Rahul Telang, ‘Research 
Note—Sell First, Fix Later: Impact of Patching on Software Quality’, (2006) 52(3) Management Science 465; 
Telang and Wattal, (n 31) 545; Ross Anderson, Rainer Böhme, Richard Clayton and Tyler Moore, ‘Security 
economics and the internal market’ Study commissioned by ENISA (2008), 
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/archive/economics-sec> accessed 20 July 2017; Oriola (n 14) 469-
473. 
31 Kesan and Hayes (n 20) 781; Hasan Cavusoglu, Huseyin Cavusoglu and Jun Zhang, ‘Security Patch 
Management: Share the Burden or Share the Damage?’ (2008) 54(4) Management Science 657. 
32 Bell (n 21) para. 2 and 7.2. 
33 Hein and Saiedian (n 26) 10. 
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However, ‘software security is essentially relative’.34 Vulnerability-free products are 
‘virtually impossible’.35 To compound the problem, the interconnectedness of systems 
multiplies the impact a single vulnerability can have. Yet, the same interconnectedness 
increases the positive effects of removing vulnerabilities. Vulnerability research benefits all 
stakeholders in cyberspace. Hence, the need for it to be undertaken effectively.  
 
 
Many vendors who supply IT products and/or are system owners using these products have 
recognised this necessity to find and patch vulnerabilities. Consequently, they employ and 
authorise one or several persons to search for vulnerabilities.36 They also resort to hacking 
contests through intermediaries such as HackerOne, effectively authorising hacking to a 
number of chosen security researchers.37 In these circumstances, issues of criminal law are 
unlikely to arise.38 
National governments, whether linked to national intelligence agencies or to law 
enforcement forces, also actively search for vulnerabilities in computer systems. Whether 
they are authorised to do so, and, if so, to what extent, is a grey area. Those questions are 
outside the scope of this paper, for they raise particular issues of national security and 
policing.  
The other actors engaged in vulnerability research are independent security 
researchers. This very diverse group can include students, academics, free-lance professionals 
or just amateurs in computer science who may be knowledgeable but work in their spare 
time.39 As they have not been hired by vendors they may appear to be vigilantes, taking the 
issue of cybersecurity into their own hands instead of leaving the discovery of vulnerabilities 
to vendors. However, the work of independent security researchers is essential to the 
improvement of the security of IT products, .  
 
 
1.2 - The need for independent security researchers 
 
It could be argued that vendors and system owners should be the only ones deciding who is 
allowed to penetrate their IT systems to discover vulnerabilities.40 However, several factors 
demonstrate the need for independent vulnerability research.  
 
To the best of our knowledge the necessity of independent researchers’ work has not yet been 
clearly articulated in the legal literature,41 despite some references to the concept of public 
                                                
34 Oriola (n 14) 472; Thompson (n 6) 543-548. 
35 Jay Pil Choi, Chaim Fershtman and Neil Gandal, ‘Network security: Vulnerabilities and disclosure policy’ 
(2010) 58(4) The Journal of Industrial Economics 868, 869. 
36 The practice originates from the US Government, especially the Department of Defence, Bell (n 21) para 2; 
Edward Hunt, ‘US Government Computer Penetration Programs and the Implications for Cyberwar’ (2012) 
34(3) IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 4, 6, 15. The practice then spread to the private sector, D. 
Russell and G.T. Gangemi,  Computer Security Basics (‘O'Reilly Media, Inc.’ 1991) 23-31. 
37 Wible (n 14). 
38 Maurushat (n 7) 10. 
39 ENISA (n 1) 20-21; Munawar Hafiz and Ming Fang, ‘Game of detections: how are security vulnerabilities 
discovered in the wild?’ (2015) Empirical Software Engineering 1, 12; Serge Egelman, Cormac Herley and Paul 
C. Van Oorschot, ‘Markets for zero-day exploits: Ethics and implications’, in Proceedings of the 2013 workshop 
on New security paradigms workshop (ACM 2013) 41, 44. 
40 Infra section 3.4 
41 Kesan and Hayes (n 20) 787-791; Craig and Shackleford (n 4); Thompson (n 6) 543-555; Kirsch (n 6) 383-
392; Wible (n 14); Mailyn Fidler, ‘Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability Trade: A Preliminary Analysis’ 
(2015) 11 I/S Journal of Law and Policy 405, which is a summary of her PhD, Anarchy or Regulation: 
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interest.42 Concerning the abundant computer science and economics literature on 
vulnerability research and markets, the picture is more complex. The benefits independent 
security researchers bring have been articulated43 at times but generally they tend to be 
assumed and/or conflated with other matters, such as the benefits of vulnerability markets and 
how they should be organised or regulated,44 and the benefits of full disclosure of 
vulnerabilities and their exploits.45 The benefits of legitimate vulnerability research can also 
emerge through studies on the black markets in which criminal hackers participate46 or grey 
markets where governments buy vulnerabilities to exploit them.47  
The literature points to four factors explaining why the work of independent security 
researchers is indispensable to preventing cybercrime. 
 
 
Firstly, as the US government found with the ‘tiger teams’ in the late ‘sixties, different teams 
discover different vulnerabilities simply because of the diversity of skills within the hired 
teams.48 In other words, no single security researcher is likely to find all vulnerabilities in a 
product, not the least because of the diversity of vulnerabilities and related discovery 
techniques available.49 Even vendors such as Microsoft or Google, with an important team of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Controlling The Global Trade in Zero-Day Vulnerabilities. Diss. Master Thesis. Stanford University, 2014, 
https://d1x4j6omi7lpzs. cloudfront. net/live/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Fidler-Zero-Day-Vulnerability-
Thesis.pdf accessed 20 July 2017. 
42 Maurushat (n 7) 48-51. 
43 Andy Ozment, ‘The Likelihood of Vulnerability Rediscovery and the Social Utility of Vulnerability Hunting.’ 
Worshop on the Economics of Information security 2005 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.479.7888&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 20 July 
2017; Egelman, Herley and Van Oorschot (n 36). 
44 Notably, Andy Ozment, ‘Bug Auctions: Vulnerability Markets Reconsidered,’ Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security 2004 19, and his PhD, Vulnerability discovery & software security, PhD diss., University 
of Cambridge, 2007, <http://andyozment.com/papers/ozment_dissertation.pdf > accessed 20 July 2017; Böhme 
(n 26); Charlie Miller, ‘The legitimate vulnerability market: Inside the secretive world of 0-day exploit sales’ 
Sixth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 2007, < http://weis07.infosecon.net/papers/29.pdf > 
accessed 20 July 2017; Sam Ransbotham, Sabyasachi Mitra and Jon Ramsey, ‘Are markets for vulnerabilities 
effective?’ ICIS 2008 Proceedings 24; Pankaj Pandey and Einar Arthur Snekkenes, ‘An assessment of market 
methods for information security risk management’ 16th IEEE International Conference on High Performance 
and Communications, WiP track. 2014; Andreas Kuehn and Milton Mueller, ‘Shifts in the Cybersecurity 
Paradigm: Zero-Day Exploits, Discourse, and Emerging Institutions’ In Proceedings of the 2014 workshop on 
New Security Paradigms Workshop (ACM 2014) 63; ENISA (n 1) 55. Contra Karthik Kannan and Rahul 
Telang, ‘Market for software vulnerabilities? Think again.’ (2005) 51(5) Management Science 726. 
45 Pu Li and H. Raghav Rao, ‘An examination of private intermediaries’ roles in software vulnerabilities 
disclosure’ (2007) 9(5) Information Systems Frontiers 531; Jukka Ruohonen, Sami Hyrynsalmi and Ville 
Leppănen, ‘Trading exploits online: A preliminary case study’, in 2016 IEEE Tenth International Conference on 
Research Challenges in Information Science (RCIS) (IEEE 2016) 1. 
46 Jaziar Radianti and Jose J. Gonzalez, ‘Understanding hidden information security threats: The vulnerability 
black market’, in HICSS 2007. 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (IEEE 2007) 
156c; Radianti and Gonzalez (n 22); Jaziar Radianti, Eliot Rich and Jose J. Gonzalez, ‘Vulnerability black 
markets: Empirical evidence and scenario simulation’, in 2009. HICSS'09. 42nd Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (IEEE 2009) 1; Jaziar Radianti, Jose J. Gonzalez and Eliot Rich, ‘A quest for a 
framework to improve software security: Vulnerability black markets scenario’ Proceedings of the 27th 
International Conference of the System Dynamics Society 2009 < 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0f29/b736c7787eaca6cd13a7fa670e258a1fdcf4.pdf> accessed 20 July 2017. 
47 Jart Armin, Paolo Foti and Marco Cremonini, ‘0-Day Vulnerabilities and Cybercrime’, in 2015 10th 
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) (IEEE 2015) 711, 716-717; Schuster, 
Van Den Berg, larrucea, Sleew and Ide-Kostic (n 4) 80. 
48 Bell (n 19); Egelman, Herley and Van Oorschot (n 39). 
49 On the diversity of techniques, Austin and Williams (n 27). On the tendency for security researchers to 
specialize in certain types of vulnerabilities, Mingyi Zhao, Jens Grossklags and Peng Liu, ‘An empirical study 
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experts dedicated to security research, will miss vulnerabilities through no fault of their own. 
Better security depends on independent security researchers filling the gaps and sharing this 
information50. Vendors may want to rely on a number of well-known security researchers but 
they should accept a wider pool of independent researchers submitting reports to improve 
security. 51 
 
Secondly, recent academic studies have demonstrated that, from vendors’ point of view, the 
work of independent researchers is particularly cost-effective, from 2 to 100 times more cost-
effective than hiring a security researcher full-time. The rewards that vendors, such as Google 
and Mozilla, pay to independent security researchers when averaged over one year cost less 
than employing one security researcher.52 
 
Thirdly, vulnerabilities are bound to be discovered by anybody looking for them.53 As noted 
above, a diversity of skills and experience is needed to find a wide range of vulnerabilities in 
a product. Being a vendor, even with a big team, does not guarantee discovering the 
vulnerability first. A criminal hacker may well discover and exploit the vulnerability without 
the vendor’s knowledge, conducting what is called a zero-day attack.54 Independent security 
researchers play an integral part in this race against criminal hackers. 
 
Finally, vulnerability research must be placed in the wider context of cybersecurity practices. 
Good security for digital products is not necessarily achieved through obscurity but through 
openness and thus exposure to hacking, whether by criminal hackers or independent security 
researchers. Cryptography55 and open-source software56 are two areas where openness 
prevails. Counter-intuitively, the security of these products tends to be better than that of the 
average proprietary product. Openness increases the risk of harm since, for open-source 
products, criminal hackers can access the code at any time and find vulnerabilities. However, 
                                                                                                                                                  
of web vulnerability discovery ecosystems’, In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer 
and Communications Security (ACM 2015) 1105, 1108-1112; Hafiz and Fang (n 39). 
50 MITRE, at https://cve.mitre.org/about/faqs.html#cve_identifier_descriptions_created>  accessed on 26 July 
2017 
51 Zhao, Grossklags and Liu (n 49) 1115; Matthew Finifter, Devdatta Akhawe and David Wagner, ‘An 
Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs’, in (2013) 23 USENIX Security 273, 279, 273-288. 
52 Finifter, Akhawe and Wagner (n 51) 280, 286. See also Aron Laszka, Mingyi Zhao and Jens Grossklags, 
‘Banishing misaligned incentives for validating reports in bug-bounty platforms’ In Ioannis Askoxylakis, Sotiris 
Ioannidis, Sokratis Katsikas and Catherine Meadows (eds), European Symposium on Research in Computer 
Security (Springer 2016) 161. 
53 Kesan and Hayes (n 20) 801; Miller (n 44); Ian Brown, Lilian Edwards and Christopher Marsden, 
‘Information security and cybercrime’, in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd 
edn, Hart 2009), 671, 687-692; Fidler, ‘Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability Trade’ (n 41) 462-465. 
54 Stefan Frei, Martin May, Ulrich Fiedler, and Bernhard Plattner, ‘Large-scale vulnerability analysis’ in 
Proceedings of the 2006 SIGCOMM workshop on Large-scale attack defense (ACM 2006) 131; Leyla Bilge and 
Tudor Dumitras, ‘Before we knew it: an empirical study of zero-day attacks in the real world’, in Proceedings of 
the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security (ACM, 2012) 833. 
55 Bruce Schneier, ‘Open Source and Security’ 15 September 1999, <https://www.schneier.com/crypto-
gram/archives/1999/0915.html> accessed 20 July 2017. The US Government’s initial approach to cryptography 
favouring secrecy gave way to full openness due to the failure to create valid encryption. 
56 Successful OSS are Linux, Firefox Mozilla, and Oracle products. Guido Schryen and Eliot Rich, ‘Increasing 
software security through open source or closed source development? Empirics suggest that we have asked the 
wrong question’ in 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) (IEEE, 2010) 1; 
confirmed in Orcun Temizkan, Ram L. Kumar, Sungjune Park and Chandrasekar Subramaniam, ‘Patch release 
behaviors of software vendors in response to vulnerabilities: an empirical analysis’ (2012) 28(4) Journal of 
management information systems 305, 328-329; Mario Silic, Andrea Back, and Dario Silic, ‘Taxonomy of 
technological risks of open source software in the enterprise adoption context’ (2015) 23(5) Information & 
Computer Security 570, 571.  
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openness fosters strong collaboration between stakeholders, who feel responsible for the 
security of all users. Thus, they internalise the costs of attacks instead of externalising them 
to the users. In other words, openness increases security.57 
 
 
In light of all these elements, independent security researchers significantly contribute to 
improving the security of IT systems. Their work is necessary and benefits the wider public, 
not just vendors. These concepts of necessity and public interest are familiar to criminal law 
defences58 but have only just started to be recognised in cybercrime.59 So far, the legal 
challenges inherent in the process of vulnerability research have dominated the conversation. 
 
 
 
2 – The criminal law challenges inherent in vulnerability research carried out by 
independent security researchers 
 
Vulnerabilities’ impact on security corresponds to the harms which the UK CMA and 
international instruments such as the Convention on Cybercrime aim to prevent. Thus, 
security researchers are no more than a step away from committing crime. A more detailed 
review of the process of vulnerability research demonstrates that the process can trigger the 
application of criminal law even when security researchers have no intention of becoming 
criminal hackers. 
 
 
2.1 - Vulnerabilities’ impact and corresponding harms: the triad of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (CIA) 
 
Vulnerabilities are assigned two identifiers, both created by the US MITRE organisation and 
which have become the industry standard worldwide60: a CVE identifier that lists the 
vulnerabilities’ characteristics,61 and a Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE) ID that 
                                                
57 Supra notes 54 and 55; Peter P. Swire, ‘A model for when disclosure helps security: What is different about 
computer and network security.’ (2004) 3 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 163, reproduced in M. Grady and 
Francisco Parisi (eds), The law and economics of cybersecurity (Cambridge University Press 2006) 29, 45; 
Steven Michael Bellovin and Randy Bush, Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous, Working draft 
for the Internet Engineering Task Force, 2002 at http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:9172  
58 Notably the defences of self-defence and duress, where the defendant may be found not guilty if his actions 
were strictly necessary and proportionate to the threat faced. Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal 
Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 134-142, 147-153, 227-237; David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s 
Criminal Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) 322-324, ch 12; John Gardner, Offences and Defences. Selected Essays in 
the Philosophy of Criminal Law (OUP 2007) ch 4 and 5; George P Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law, 
American, Comparative and International. Volume One: Foundations (OUP 2007) 165-66, 197, 310, 321-324.  
59 Infra section 4.  See also Maurushat (n 7) 48-51.. 
60 ITU endorsed the CVE standard in 2011 “as a part of its new "Global Cybersecurity Information Exchange 
techniques (X.CYBEX)" by issuing Recommendation ITU-T X.1520 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
(CVE), that is based upon CVE’s current Compatibility Requirements,” (see CVE website, 
https://cve.mitre.org/about/ ). The other databases of vulnerabilities also use the CVE repository (see next 
footnote). 
61 Two databases using CVE exist: the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and the OVAL database hosted 
now by GitHub. The Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) created in 2004 to aggregate all 
information closed on 5 April 2016. On those dabatases, see notably Sugandh Shah and Babu M. Mehtre, ‘An 
overview of vulnerability assessment and penetration testing techniques’ (2015) 11(1) Journal of Computer 
Virology and Hacking Techniques 27; Sushama Karumanchi and Anna Cinzia Squicciarini, ‘In the wild: a large 
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describes the vulnerabilities’ impacts on security in terms of a possible breach of the 
confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of an IT system.62 
Discovering a vulnerability endangering the confidentiality of a system will enable 
the disclosure of information which is usually private or confidential. A potential breach of 
integrity facilitates compromising the system owner’s ability to maintain, ensure and account 
for the accuracy and consistency of the systems and data held. A wide range of situations are 
covered: attempts to access an IT system without the owner’s authorisation, unauthorised 
exploration of the accessed system or network, damage to data, and installation of malware 
with subsequent impacts on the trustworthiness and veracity of the data. Finally, a breach of 
availability is associated with impaired or impossible access to a computer system or 
program. 
 
 
This triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) describes what the language of 
criminal law would call the harms resulting from the exploitation of vulnerabilities.63 The 
Council of Europe’s Convention 185 on cybercrime expressly acknowledged the link 
between the CIA and criminal law by classifying computer misuse offences under Title 1’s 
heading of ‘offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data 
and systems’. In contrast, the UK CMA does not refer to these three possible harms but, like 
other computer misuse legislations, it was drafted with some, if not all, of those harms in 
mind.64  
The offence of ‘unauthorised access’ under s1 CMA aims to deter a hacker from 
committing any act with intention to secure access to data, programs or computer systems. 
This act, on its own, breaches the integrity of the IT system, and could lead to breaches of 
confidentiality and/or availability. The offences of s3 CMA and, when critical infrastructures 
are involved, of s3ZA CMA, prohibit any act with intent to, or recklessness as to impairing, 
the operation of a computer or reliability of data. Thus, they protect against breaches of 
integrity and availability, for example where the vulnerability would enable the installation of 
malware or the triggering of a denial of service attack. 
 
 
As vulnerabilities are so closely related to harms, from the system owner’s point of view, the 
discovery of vulnerabilities may at the very least create a risk of harm. Thus, the security 
researcher is no more than a step away from committing a crime. A more detailed analysis of 
the process of vulnerability research reveals that the independent security researcher’s legal 
position is even worse than the vulnerabilities’ impact surmises.  
 
 
 
2.2 - The process of vulnerability research: harms and criminal liability 
                                                                                                                                                  
scale study of web services vulnerabilities’, in Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied 
Computing (ACM 2014) 1239. 
62 R. A. Martin, ‘Non-Malicious Taint: Bad Hygiene is as Dangerous to the Mission as Malicious Intent’ Report 
for MITRE, n.13-4399, at 6 Table 1 <https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/non-malicious-taint-
bad-hygiene-is-as-dangerous-to-the-mission-as.> accessed 20 July 2017. On the CWE, Hein and Saiedian (n 26) 
17-18. 
63 On the triad, James P Anderson, Computer security technology planning study, 1972. L.G. Hanscom Field, 
Bedford (MA): Deputy for Command and Management Systems, HQ Electronic Systems Division (AFSC). 
Report No.: ESD-TR-73-51, Vol. I, NTIS AD-758 206, <http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/history/papers/ande72a.pdf > 
accessed 20 July 2017. 
64 Infra section 3.4 
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The process of vulnerability research includes three stages: discovery, verification and 
disclosure of the vulnerability. At each stage the security researcher’s activities may be 
harmful to the vendor. Given that the CMA offences were designed to protect against those 
harms, the security researcher may be criminally liable for at least one if not several of those 
offences. 
 
 
2.2.1 - The discovery of vulnerabilities  
 
A detailed analysis of the complex process of discovery is difficult in the space of this article 
but it is still possible to pinpoint where the process may harm or create a risk of harm to the 
vendor, and thus where the security researcher may be criminally liable. 
 
 
2.2.1.1 - The harms 
Since neither the independent security researcher nor the criminal hacker are likely to have 
contacted the vendor prior to the search the vendor cannot attribute actions to a particular 
person. Vendors must rely on objective analysis of conduct to understand who is who. The 
problem is that the security researcher’s actions at the discovery stage often resemble the 
initial stages of an attack by a criminal hacker in terms of the objectives, nature and 
proportionality of actions, and/or harms created.65 Vendors do not know whether or not the 
intrusion is ‘friendly’. 
 
 
For the vendor, both the security researcher and criminal hackers share the same initial 
objective: to explore the IT system so as to secure an access the vendor has not authorised. 
Thus, both compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the system. In the initial stages of 
discovery they may also adopt similar approaches to the search for vulnerabilities, albeit for 
different reasons. Both may be very careful not to intentionally alter or delete data or 
programs: the criminal hacker in order to avoid detection by the vendor, the security 
researcher out of respect for the vendor.66 Only after having found a vulnerability will a 
criminal hacker, for example, install malware that will control the IT system, and/or damage 
the data held. Thus, during the discovery stage, lack of damage may not indicate clearly to 
the vendor whose actions they are: those of a security researcher or of a criminal hacker. 
Conversely, the methods and hacking tools security researchers use to discover 
vulnerabilities are rarely without a risk, even if a very low risk, of creating damage. The same 
tools are available to criminal hackers, often on an open-source basis.67 Causing intentional 
                                                
65 R J Potts, ‘Hacking: The Threats’, (1989) 2(1) Computer Audit Update 14, 15; Jen. Ellis, ‘How Do We De-
Criminalize Security Research? AKA What’s Next for the CFAA?’, 26 January 2015, at 
https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2015/01/26/how-do-we-de-criminalize-security-
research-aka-what-s-next-for-the-cfaa, cited in ENISA (n 1) 66, fn 228; Bryan Smith, William Yurcik and 
David Doss, ‘Ethical hacking: the security justification redux’, in 2002 International Symposium on Technology 
and Society, 2002 (ISTAS'02) (IEEE, 2002) 374, 377; Stephen Northcutt, Jerry Shenk, Dave Shackleford, Tim 
Rosenberg, Raul Siles and Steve Mancini, ‘Penetration testing: Assessing your overall security before attackers 
do.’ SANS Institute (2006), 4 
<http://www.sans.org/reading_room/analysts_program/PenetrationTesting_June06.pdf > accessed 20 July 2017. 
The SANS Institute is a private US for-profit organisation, reknown for its training and guidance in 
cybersecurity matters. See also, Thompson (n 6) 556. 
66 Northcutt, Shenk, Shackleford, Rosenberg, Siles, and Mancini (n 65) 4. 
67 Hafiz and Fang (n 39) 24-25.  
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damage has always been presented as the hallmark of criminal hackers.68. In contrast, expert 
security researchers will take reasonable care and notably avoid using certain techniques 
known in the security industry to cause a higher risk of damage.69 However, damage may be 
caused without intention. Vendors themselves acknowledge the risk of damage by security 
researchers. Their vulnerability disclosure policies and bug bounty programmes recommend 
that security researchers act in good faith to avoid destroying data or impairing the operation 
of their services if they want to escape criminal prosecution.70 
 
Thus, from the vendor’s point of view, the search for vulnerabilities, whether by criminals or 
by independent security researchers, leads to a breach of integrity and confidentiality. Only 
when the security researcher discloses his/her findings to the vendor will the vendor know, 
retrospectively, that the ‘attack’ was not by a criminal hacker. Meanwhile, the vendor may 
find it difficult to distinguish a security researcher from a criminal hacker through the natures 
and proportionality of their respective actions.71  
 
 
 
2.2.1.2 - Preventing harms: the risk of criminal liability  
 
This process of discovery may trigger the security researchers’ liability for s1 CMA. The 
offence of unauthorised access was designed to protect users against any potential intrusion 
into their systems well before hackers’ conduct could be identified as ‘harmless’ or, on the 
contrary, harmful, causing damage to systems and/or data. It is a conduct offence. The 
threshold for triggering criminal liability is very low. No access needs to be secured for the 
offence to be committed. It suffices that the defendant ‘causes a computer to perform any 
function with intent to secure access’. Thus, to commit s1 CMA actus reus, security 
researchers do not need to find a vulnerability that would enable them to secure access. 
Exploration, with its objective to find a vulnerability that secures access to the system, can 
constitute the conduct of the offence,.  
                                                
68 As far back as 1984, Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the computer revolution. Vol. 4 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2001) 4; Hugo Cornwall (pseudonym for Peter Sommer), The Hacker’s Handbook (1st edn, Century 
1985) 3; Richard C. Hollinger, ‘Hackers: Computer heroes or electronic highwaymen?’ (1991) 21(1) ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and society 6; Reid Skibell, ‘The myth of the computer hacker’ (2002) 5(3) Information, 
Communication & Society 336, 350-352; Jim Thomas, ‘The moral ambiguity of social control in cyberspace: a 
retro-assessment of the “golden age” of hacking’ (2005) 7(5) New Media & Society 599, 618; Orly Turgeman-
Goldschmidt, ‘Hackers' accounts: Hacking as a social entertainment’ (2005) 23(1) Social Science Computer 
Review 8, 17, 21; Kirsty Best, ‘Visceral Hacking or Packet Wanking? The Ethics of Digital Code, Culture’ 
(2006) 47(2) Theory and Critique 213, 218, 223; A Nehaluddin, ‘Hackers' Criminal Behaviour and Laws 
Related to Hacking’ (2009) 15(7) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 159, 159-160; Tim Jordan, 
‘A genealogy of hacking’ (2016) Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media 
Technologies 1, 8-10. 
69 For penetration testing, Karen Scarfone, Murugiah Souppaya, Amanda Cody and Angela Orebaugh, 
‘Technical guide to information security testing and assessment.’ 2008 NIST Special Publication 800-115, 5-2 , 
https://www.nist.gov/publications/technical-guide-information-security-testing-and-assessment> accessed 20 
July 2017; Bryan Smith, Yurcik and Doss (n 65)  377. With regards to the specific risks of damage when finding 
one type of vulnerabilities, the buffer overflow, OWASP, Buffer overflow, 2009, 
<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Buffer_Overflow> accessed 20 July 2017; Andrew Cormack (n 7) 317. 
70 For example, Facebook’s vulnerability disclosure policy, < https://www.facebook.com/whitehat/> accessed 
20 July 2017; US Department of Defense, Vulnerability disclosure policy, published on the website of Hacker 
One, an intermediary between vendors and independent security researchers, 
<https://hackerone.com/deptofdefense> accessed 20 July 2017, also reported by reputable security expert, 
Krebs, ‘DoD Opens .Mil to Legal Hacking, Within Limits,’ 23 November 2016, 
<https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/department-of-defense/ > accessed 20 July 2017. 
71 Thompson (n 6) 556-558, 571. 
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With regard to the mens rea, two elements need to be satisfied. Firstly, the conduct 
must be intentional, direct intention being defined as the aim or purpose of committing the 
prohibited act,72 with motives being irrelevant.73 Since security researchers ‘actively explore 
for these vulnerabilities’74 they act with the aim and purpose of securing access to data, i.e. 
with the intention of securing access as per s1 CMA. Motives being irrelevant to the 
definition of intention, they are unable to argue that their reasons for securing access are to 
improve security. Secondly, security researchers need to know that the access they intend to 
secure is at the time unauthorised. Under s17(5) CMA lack of authorisation results from the 
defendant not being ‘entitled to control access’ and ‘not hav[ing] consent to access by a 
person’ entitled to control access. Independent security researchers are not hired by vendors 
and will not seek their express authorisation prior to the exploration of the IT systems and 
networks. Thus, they do not have consent to access or to secure access.75 
 
Hence, in 2005, Cuthbert was convicted under s1CMA for having searched for vulnerabilities 
on a website.76 He did not find any but he actively searched with the aim of securing access 
and thus acted intentionally. He also knew the access was unauthorised. His motives – to 
improve security by checking whether the charity website he gave money to was fraudulent - 
were irrelevant.77 As the Crown Court judge acknowledged, Cuthbert met the requirements of 
the offence.78 Yet, Cuthbert was a security researcher. An active member of the international 
OWASP organisation supporting the security community, he initiated the first guidelines 
regarding testing systems for vulnerabilities.79 However, in the absence of a defence for 
hacking, the judge had to find him guilty for s1 CMA despite his ‘considerable regret’ about 
doing so.80  
 
 
In some circumstances whether vendors authorised or not security researchers to access the 
system may be difficult to ascertain. Vendors such as Microsoft, Google and Facebook 
publish a vulnerability disclosure policy, often in conjunction with a bug bounty programme 
to financially reward security researchers for their findings of vulnerabilities. Their 
vulnerability disclosure policy determines the boundaries of what vendors consider to be 
acceptable searching for vulnerabilities. Such authorisation could constitute consent to search 
and thus to access a system as per s17(5) CMA81. 
 However, vulnerability disclosure policies are not systematically detailed as to what is 
or is not authorised. Beyond the conditions they may expressly establish, the policies may be 
                                                
72 R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 
73 A-G’s Reference (no 1 of 2002) [2002] EWCA Crim 2392. See J Horder, ‘On the Irrelevance of Motive in 
Criminal Law’, in J Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP 2000) 173. 
74 Hafiz and Fang (n 39) 23-24; Zhao, Grossklags and Liu (n 49) 1109-1111. 
75 Cormack (n 7) 318-319; Ian Walden also cites Cuthbert but does not explain the defendant’s background, , 
Computer crimes and digital investigations (2nd, OUP 2015) 164, para 3.239. For the US, Kesan and Hayes (n 
20) 791; Oriola (n 14) 501-507; Kirsch (n 6) 392-394; Thompson (n 6) 560-568; Wibble (n 14) 1581-1584. 
More generally, Maurushat (n 7) 38-44. 
76 Oates (n 10) 
77 P Sommer, ‘Computer Misuse Prosecutions’ (2005) 16(5) Computers and Law 24-26; Cormack (n 5) 311. 
78 Oates (n 10)  
79 Between 2003 and 2005, OWASP, Testing Guide Frontispiece,  
<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_Guide_Frontispiece > accessed 20 July 2017. 
80 Oates (n 8) 
81 In R v Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin), the Court accepted that for the purpose of s17(5) CMA, consent 
to receive bona fide email communications could be granted in general terms. This implied consent would not 
extend to communications that were not bona fide because they demonstrated on the contrary the purpose of 
interrupting the proper operation and use of the system.  
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vague enough to allow for different interpretations as to what they authorise. For example, 
they often ban intentional damage, but remain silent as to whether non-intentional damage, 
which may happen, would still be tolerated.82 This imprecision leaves space for the security 
researcher to contend that his/her actions complied with the terms of the policy and for the 
vendor to argue the opposite, that the action was not authorised. As Maurushat put it, ‘the 
terms ‘unauthorised’ and ‘access’ do not produce a similar set of shared assumptions in the 
technical, legal or ethical fields’.83 In that case, which perspective should be taken into 
account? Walden has indicated that, generally, it should be the controller’s perspective, hence 
here the vendor’s, as objectively assessed by the Courts.84 No UK court has yet discussed the 
concept of authorisation in this particular context. Nevertheless, indirectly, the 2012 UK case 
of R v Mangham illustrates the difficulties of interpretation and of relying on the vendor’s 
perspective to define authorisation.85 Because Mangham pleaded guilty to charges under s1 
and s3 CMA offences,86 the question of what constitutes authorisation could not be raised 
before the court. However, the elements that would matter to determine authorisation or lack 
of are present in the discussion on the mitigating factors the Court of Appeal could take into 
account to quash the original sentence of a serious crime prevention order and 8 months 
imprisonment. 
 
 
Mangham found vulnerabilities in one of Facebook’s servers. He explored further these 
initial vulnerabilities with the help of a program he created to utilise a Facebook employee’s 
identity. He then accessed the source code owned by the company. He copied part of an email 
archive, as well as part of the source code.87 Facebook realised that Mangham had gained 
access to its system before he could write and disclose his report on the vulnerabilities.88 It 
had a vulnerability disclosure policy but no bounty programme rewarding security 
researchers like Mangham.89  
Clearly ‘upset’ by this repeated access, including to its source code, Facebook argued 
a lack of authorisation and interpreted his actions as industrial espionage, not as vulnerability 
research conducted within the terms of its vulnerability disclosure policy.90 Upon review of 
the events, the Crown Prosecution Service decided it was in the public interest to prosecute 
Mangham. For the prosecution, Mangham had stolen ‘invaluable’ intellectual property and 
‘acted with determination, undoubted ingenuity and it was sophisticated, it was calculating’, 
costing Facebook $200,000 (£126,400) for the investigation. 91 In contrast, Mangham claimed 
to be an ethical hacker and security consultant who had previously reported vulnerabilities 
either for free or against fee, 92 a fact acknowledged by the Court. 93 His aim ‘was to identify 
                                                
82 Supra n 67 
83 Maurushat (n 7) 49. 
84 Walden (n 75) para 3.237-3.238, without mentioning vulnerability research. 
85 [2002] EWCA Crim 973 
86 He refused to plead guilty to charges for committing s3A offences on making and adapting hacking tools, 
Mangham (n 85) para 2. 
87 id, para 4. 
88 id, paras 8, 22. 
89 Facebook launched its bug bounty programme after Mangham’s arrest, 
<https://www.facebook.com/security/posts/238039389561434> accessed 20 July 2017. Yet, Facebook’s chief 
security officer Joe Sullivan (@joesullivana, 21 February 2012) claimed the opposite in an official comment 
about Mangham as reported by reputable security consultant Graham Cluley (n 10). 
90 Maurushat (n 7) 41-42. 
91 BBC news, ‘York Facebook hacking student Glenn Mangham jailed’, 17 February 2012, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-york-north-yorkshire-17079853> accessed 20 July 2017. 
92 ibid.; Ben Quinn, ‘Facebook hacker jailed for eight months’, The Guardian 18 February 2012  
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/feb/17/facebook-hacker-glenn-mangham-jailed> accessed 20 
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vulnerabilities in the system so I could compile a report that I could then bundle over to 
Facebook and show them what was wrong with their system.’94 
 
 
Mangham certainly accessed the system and confidential data. Given that s1 and s3 CMA are 
designed to protect against breaches of integrity and confidentiality Mangham’s prosecution 
seemed justified. However, Mangham also operated in the knowledge of Facebook’s 
vulnerability disclosure policy. The December 2010 policy, made of three lines, stated that 
Facebook ‘will not bring any lawsuit against you or ask law enforcement to investigate you 
for that research’ if ‘in the course of the research you made a good faith effort to avoid 
privacy violations, destruction of data, or interruption or degradation of our service’, and if 
the vulnerability was not revealed to the public before Facebook had the chance to fix it.95 
Arguably, a vulnerability disclosure policy cannot establish a legal test, but the policy 
indicates that Facebook authorises access to its system to find vulnerabilities upon four 
conditions: not to violate privacy, destroy data, interrupt or degrade the service, and not to 
reveal the vulnerability to the public. The question can thus be whether Mangham breached 
any of the conditions Facebook established in its vulnerability disclosure policy. The answer 
is more nuanced and ambiguous than the guilty plea for s1 and s3 CMA offences would 
suggest. 
 
 
Undoubtedly, Mangham destroyed the data revealing his trail, whereas Facebook’s policy 
expressly prohibits the destruction of data. This action can thus be considered not to be 
authorised and contrary to s3 CMA criminalising any unauthorised act with intent to damage 
or impair the reliability of data.  
The lack of authorisation is however less obvious for other activities. Mangham 
intentionally used an employee’s log-in credentials to explore further the potential impacts of 
the initial vulnerability. This is likely to be problematic as Mangham hid behind another’s 
identity. However, the policy itself does not expressly prohibit such action. Furthermore, the 
use of the identity was not followed by a violation of privacy; it was only to secure access, 
rather than to peak at the employee’s personal or professional life, or to impersonate the 
employee in other circumstances. Facebook itself accepted in Court that ‘no personal use of 
data […] was compromised’.96 Thus, it could be argued that Mangham avoided in, ‘good 
faith’, violations of privacy, and thus stayed within the boundaries of Facebook’s policy. 
 Furthermore, the Court noted as a mitigation factor that Mangham did not interrupt or 
degrade Facebook’s service.97 Facebook admitted in Court that it suffered no loss as it 
retrieved the source code in its entirety.98 In that respect, Mangham could be said to have 
complied with Facebook’s policy not to destroy data, or interrupt or degrade the service.  
Moreover, as the Court noted again as a mitigation factor, Mangham did not disclose 
the copy of the source code he held for three weeks. In spite of the likely high commercial 
                                                                                                                                                  
July 2017; Mangham’s own blog, ‘The Facebook Hack. What really happened’, Blog Ebor’ Hack’em, 23 April 
2012, <http://gmangham.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/facebook-hack-what-really-happened.html> accessed 20 July 
2017. 
93 Mangham (n 85) para 7.  
94 Quinn (n 92) 
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value of the code on the black market he did not seek to gain any financial advantage. 99 Thus 
Mangham did not reveal the vulnerability to the public, in compliance with Facebook’s 
policy. In addition, Mangham held the copy on a secure storage medium unconnected to the 
Internet. The source code was thus inaccessible to hackers and more secure than Facebook’s 
own storage.  
 
Thus, many of Mangham’s actions seem proportionate to his objective of finding 
vulnerabilities to benefit the wider public. They appear to support his claim that he searched 
ethically for vulnerabilities in accordance with Facebook’s short vulnerability disclosure 
policy. The remaining question is whether Mangham should have stopped and immediately 
reported to Facebook, as the Crown Court judge suggested. No clear guidance exists but three 
elements point towards accepting further exploration. Firstly, ‘the security mindset involves 
thinking like an attacker, an adversary or a criminal’.100 A criminal hacker would not stop at 
the first vulnerability. S/he would try to find other vulnerabilities. Further exploration can be 
appropriate.101 The difference would be that the security researcher would not exploit the 
vulnerabilities, which was precisely what Mangham refrained from doing. Secondly, 
Mangham claimed he wanted to analyse the source code as a means of finding further 
vulnerabilities. The claim cannot be easily dismissed in light of the OWASP testing guide for 
the security industry, in which such analysis is presented as possibly the sole means to find 
some vulnerabilities in a system.102 Thirdly, Facebook itself changed its policy after 
Mangham’s conviction, and currently states ‘You do not exploit a security issue that you 
discover for any reason. (This includes demonstrating additional risk, such as attempted 
compromise of sensitive company data or probing for additional issues.)’.103 Facebook’s 
previous policy applicable to Mangham did not contain this prohibition and thus could have 
been interpreted as not forbidding Mangham’s further exploration.104 
 
 
Facebook may have felt aggrieved by the finding of the source code, which breached 
confidentiality, and consequently justified in its decision to withdraw authorisation. However, 
the terms of the vulnerability disclosure policy and the practices of vulnerability research 
leave, after the event, enough room to argue that Facebook’s policy, at the time of its 
publication, authorised many of Mangham’s activities at the discovery stage, and that his 
search for vulnerabilities was genuine.105 The next stage in the process of vulnerability 
research is not without its own legal challenges either. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 - The verification of the vulnerability   
 
To verify the vulnerability the security researcher will write a proof of concept that 
demonstrates how the vulnerability could lead to a breach of confidentiality, integrity and/or  
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availability. For example, the proof of concept may demonstrate how, at the most basic level, 
a vulnerability affects the functioning of an application and thus violates the availability of 
the IT system and network.106  
In the process the security researcher may violate s3 and s3A CMA. The execution of 
the proof of concept could constitute an unauthorised act aimed at impairing the functioning 
of a computer, as per s3 CMA. The proof of concept could constitute an ‘article’ or a 
computer program aimed at impairing the operation of a computer, as per s3A CMA. The 
security researcher created it and executed it intentionally, with the aim and purpose of doing 
so, thus violating s3 and s3A CMA.  
 Furthermore, finding a vulnerability may coincide with a breach of confidentiality 
and/or integrity. The security researcher may then access confidential or personal data and 
copy the data onto an external drive to evidence the vulnerability, as Mangham did when 
copying a selection of Facebook’s email archives. According to s17(2)(b) CMA copying the 
data ‘on any storage medium’ would constitute an act to secure access, and thus would 
constitute s1 CMA. S55 Data Protection Act 1998 may also be violated when the security 
researcher copies and thus obtains personal data without consent.107 
 
Therefore, the security researcher is expected to establish a proof of concept, before, so as to 
ensure that the vulnerability exists and demonstrate potential or existing harm. Yet, this 
process may fall within the scope of criminal law. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 - The disclosure of the vulnerability  
 
Disclosure can be done in many ways: to vendors exclusively or to third parties which will 
relay the information to the vendors (coordinated disclosure), to vendors for a given period of 
time and then to the public (delayed full disclosure), or directly to the public (full disclosure).  
Disclosure is certainly a contentious issue within the security industry, and practices 
vary enormously across security researchers. When established in late 1988 the CERT, in the 
US, promoted and continues to favour disclosure to vendors until vendors have fixed the 
vulnerability and are in a position to release the patch to the public.108 Then the vulnerability 
will be reported to the public and available for all to see. This form of disclosure should 
demonstrate that the security researcher did not intend to exploit the found vulnerability or to 
harm the vendor. It could also be presumed to be the most effective method for enabling the 
patching of the vulnerability but vendors do not always take the information seriously, and/or 
may unnecessarily delay the release of the patch.109 
Thus, many security researchers choose the option of full disclosure, i.e. disclosing to 
the public by various means: hacking conferences, the use of media and, mostly, public lists 
such as Bugtraq, which was created in 1993 in reaction to the CERT’s own disclosure policy 
and with the aim of forcing vendors to fix vulnerabilities quickly. Full disclosure can be 
immediate or delayed. Delayed is when disclosure is first to vendors, then to the public when 
vendors, lacking ‘maturity’, either do not respond or are too slow in responding.110 Google’s 
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Project Zero, for example, gives ninety days for vendors to fix vulnerabilities or face public 
disclosure after the stated period.111 
 
 
This disclosure to the public, whether immediate or delayed, has been demonstrated to be 
effective, with vendors taking a more active stance towards fixing vulnerabilities.112 
However, it may be problematic with regard to criminal law. By posting the information 
about the vulnerability to the public the security researcher provides information to criminal 
hackers about which vulnerabilities they could exploit to commit other crimes. The disclosure 
may trigger accessorial liability under section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, 
whereby the security researcher has intentionally aided and abetted criminal hackers.  
Intention can be direct, with the accessory aiming to assist or influence the principal, or 
oblique, the accessory having foresight about the principal’s offence as a virtual certainty.113 
Disclosure to the public is known among the security industry to increase the number of 
attacks.114 In legal terms their knowledge could amount to the definition of oblique intention: 
it is ‘virtually certain’ that the information will be used by some hackers for criminal 
endeavours. Therefore, disclosure of vulnerabilities to the general public may trigger the 
security researcher’s accessorial liability for crimes committed by hackers maliciously 
exploiting the disclosed vulnerabilities.115  
The security researcher’s disclosure may constitute the offence of s 3A (2) CMA 
1990. A person who supplies an article believing that it is likely to be used to assist with the 
commission of offences under the CMA may be liable for up to two years imprisonment upon 
indictment. Belief is considered to be more than mere suspicion but less than knowledge and 
certainly less than intention.116 For the same reasons as above security researchers are likely 
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to meet the test since it could be argued that they believe, if not know, that their proof of 
concept ‘is likely to be used’ by others to commit crime. To avoid disclosure to the public, 
and thus to criminals, mailing lists could be restricted to vetted security researchers. However 
the legal challenges raised by full disclosure to the public would not completely disappear. 
Even intermediaries, such as ZDI, which use vetted mailing lists are likely to resort to full 
disclosure if vendors do not provide a patch within the time-frame proposed.117 
 
 
2.2.4 - Conclusion 
Full disclosure – delayed or immediate - is not without its own ambiguities. Not surprisingly,  
discussions of its pros and cons have been present over the past thirty years in the security 
industry, with security researchers seen alternatively as promoting a more secure ecosystem 
or as ‘vigilantes’ there to ‘humiliate’ vendors.118 At the heart of these ambiguities, though, is 
a lack of adequate channels to pressurise vendors into fixing vulnerabilities by means other 
than full disclosure. Security researchers would be less inclined to use full disclosure if a 
regulatory framework were to effectively promote what ENISA called vendors’ maturity in 
responding adequately and in a timely manner to disclosure. This aspect of the problem is 
beyond the scope of this article but it shows that, of all the ambiguities of the process of 
vulnerability research, those at the disclosure stage could be resolved by security researchers 
adopting other conduct whilst still reporting vulnerabilities.  
In contrast, a change of behaviours cannot dispel the ambiguities at the discovery and 
verification stages. Security researchers could be more careful and their search more 
constrained, as Mangham partially illustrates, but vulnerability research remains about 
learning how to open a door which nobody was meant to open. Security researchers cannot 
stop hacking, i.e. exploring systems to gain unauthorised access, and they cannot stop 
verifying vulnerabilities without at times creating a proof of concept which may trigger 
liability under the CMA. 
 
 
Based on this review of the process of vulnerability research this paper argues that the 
controversial aspects of the process are the discovery and verification stages. At the discovery 
stage the thorniest issue is that of the authorisation at the heart of s1 CMA and also s3 CMA. 
In the absence of a vulnerability disclosure policy and/or bug bounty programme the security 
researcher will act without authorisation and thus violate the law even if s/he has taken 
reasonable care and is acting in the public interest, as per Cuthbert. A vulnerability disclosure 
policy and/or bug bounty programme would grant authorisation under certain conditions and 
if the policy is adequately written. However, the security researcher may face uncertainty, as 
in Mangham. Furthermore, at the verification stage the security researcher may commit 
several CMA offences even if s/he discloses responsibly the information and proof of concept 
to the vendor. Thus, criminal law treats the security researcher as if s/he were a malicious 
hacker intending to commit crimes, in the process ignoring the objective of public interest 
s/he aims to promote. The challenge will be to reconcile the need for vendors to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of their systems with the need to establish a space 
for security researchers to act without the fear of criminal liability. 
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 Three options are possible: modifying the structure of the current offences, 
establishing adequate prosecutorial guidelines, or a public interest defence. The first option 
was explored in the discussions that preceded the Computer Misuse Bill of 1990. 
 
 
 
3 - Revisiting the past: the UK’s failed attempts to recognise vulnerability research 
prior to the Computer Misuse Bill of 1990 
 
The expression ‘vulnerability research’ never featured in discussions on the criminalisation of 
hacking and the potential need for an offence of unauthorised access. Nevertheless, the idea 
that hacking, notably for security purposes, might be recognised as a legal activity permeated 
the debates at regular intervals until the start of parliamentary debates on the Computer 
Misuse Bill in February 1990.  
The Scottish Law Commission (SLC) and the English Law Commission (ELC) first 
proposed making hacking – unauthorised access - partially legal in their respective reports of 
1987 and 1988. Subsequently, MP Emma Nicholson tabled a Private Member’s Bill in April 
1989 with terms which were very similar to the Law Commissions’ proposals. However, the 
Bill’s subsequent withdrawal in July 1989 signalled a change of policy. The reasons for this 
change hold the key to why adopting similar proposals would not be a viable option. 
 
 
3.1 - The Scottish Law Commission’s proposal to recognise hacking for security 
purposes 
 
In its 1987 draft Bill the SLC adopted a nuanced position towards hacking and hackers in 
general. For the SLC the term ‘hacking’ covered a wide range of behaviours and motives: 
from the hacker’s mere curiosity ‘to test their electronic and technological skills’ with a lack 
of ‘nefarious motive in mind’, to the ‘unscrupulous person’ aiming to access data to ‘use for 
his own advantage’.119 The structure of its proposed offences constituted an ‘attempt to 
distinguish between the ‘probably harmless’ hacker and the malicious one’.120  
This reference to ‘harmless’ hacking echoes passages of its first report of 1986, where 
the SLC acknowledged that a hacker could be a highly skilled ‘computer enthusiast’,121 and 
that hacking could be ‘no more than a harmless sport [the hacker] engaged in simply for the 
intellectual challenge which it presents’.122 This discourse corresponds to the original 
meaning of ‘hacking’ before it became associated predominantly with crime, in the UK, by 
late 1989. 123 
Nevertheless, this discourse is partially misleading. The SLC had little doubt that 
gaining unauthorised access led the hacker to view data he was not supposed to see in the 
first place.124 However, in contrast to its 1986 proposal,125 in 1987 the SLC refused to 
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recommend the criminalisation of unauthorised access just because the hacker would have 
accessed personal data and invaded the person’s privacy. Hacking ‘in order to inspect or 
otherwise to acquire knowledge of the program or the data’ would have been legal. Similarly, 
the SLC rejected the criminalisation of unauthorised access in order ‘to add to, erase or 
otherwise alter the program or the data’.  
Hacking would have become illegal only in three situations: when the hacker intended 
to ‘procur[e] an advantage for himself or another person, […when s/he would intentionally] 
damag[e] another person’s interests’ (clause 1), or when s/he ‘recklessly’ damaged another 
person’s interests by ‘altering, corrupting, erasing or adding to a program or data’ (clause 2). 
Penalties were up to 6 months imprisonment on summary conviction, 5 years on indictment 
(clause 3).  
 
 
It is difficult to know to what extent the SLC was cognisant of the precise impact of its 
proposals on hackers engaged in vulnerability research. In particular, the SLC did not explain 
the test for recklessness.126. It also did not mention whether security industry standards could 
be used, although some had already emerged at the time.127 On the other hand, the SLC’s 
choice of words, notably the verb ‘to inspect’, implied an awareness of hacking for security 
purposes, where hacking leads the hacker to analyse the security strengths and weaknesses of 
an IT system. 
 
 
3.2 - The English Law Commission’s proposals of 1988 
 
In its Working Paper 110, whose structure is very similar to that of the SLC’s reports, the 
ELC also extensively reviewed the pros and cons of criminalising hacking. Contrary to the 
SLC, it did not reach ‘any provisional conclusions’ as to the principle and scope of 
criminalisation of unauthorised access,128 and thus proposed four very different wordings for 
the offence of unauthorised access.129  
The fourth and broadest option recalls the SLC’s first proposal of 1986. It would have 
criminalised any unauthorised access, whatever the ‘subsidiary purpose’ of the hacker and 
independently of whether the hacker ‘took reasonable care to avoid causing damage to the 
computer system’. The ELC clearly stated there would be ‘no defence’ offered to the hacker, 
whatever the motive.130 The first option was similar to the fourth in that unauthorised access 
would be criminalised whatever the purpose, although access was restricted to specific types 
of data, such as personal data.131  
Conversely, the second and third options were closer to the SLC’s 1987 Bill in scope 
and spirit. It refused to recommend the criminalisation of unauthorised access in order ‘to 
inspect’ computer systems unless the ‘inspection’ was ‘done for the purpose of either gaining 
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an advantage for oneself or another, or of damaging another person's interests’ (option B) or 
unless damage existed, on a strict liability basis (option C). 132  
 
 
With its option B the ELC took the same position as the SLC with regard to invasion of 
privacy. Invasion of privacy not exploited or not intended to be exploited by a hacker for his 
own benefit or another’s benefit would have been legal. Breaching confidentiality was not 
sufficient to justify criminalisation without evidence of the hacker’s further intention to create 
harm. 
Regarding the harm of damage, in its option B the ELC proposed tolerating reckless 
damage. This included hackers whose only motive was ‘to overcome security devices’133 but 
who would have been cautious not to create intentional harm. Conversely, its option C would 
have criminalised hacking causing damage on a strict liability basis, even when the hacker 
had taken reasonable care in his exploration, the ELC asking for clarification on the 
likelihood of this risk of harm by hacking.134 
 
 
The novelty of the SLC’s and ELC’s proposals hardly attracted any comment at the time. In 
1987 Professor Smith indicated that hacking for security purposes was a ‘controversial’ 
question Parliament needed to discuss.135 Another author considered that these hackers ‘have 
served at least one useful social purpose’.136 Yet, the impact the proposals would have had on 
security researchers remained undiscussed. Whether this silence meant acceptance of the 
proposals and reasoning is difficult to tell but in April 1989 MP Emma Nicholson presented a 
Bill which drafted the offence of unauthorised access in very similar terms to these of the 
SLC and ELC. 
 
 
3. 3 - The unsuccessful April 1989 Bill  
 
Put forward a few months after the ELC 1988 report, Nicholson’s Private Member’s Bill 
proposed an offence of unauthorised access with a slightly broader scope than that of the 
SLC’s proposal. Reckless damage would have been criminalised, in addition to recklessly 
gaining an advantage or causing prejudice (clause 1(1)). The Bill also proposed to 
‘outlaw[…] the possession of anything intended to be used to gain unauthorised access to a 
computer as defined in clause 1’ (Clause 1(2)) 137, which would have criminalised hacking 
tools and possession of information on to how to gain unauthorised access which was 
circulating on bulletin boards. Penalties would have been up to ten years imprisonment or 
five years if acts were committed recklessly (clause 2). 
 Nicholson’s own discourse is unclear regarding which behaviours her Bill intended to 
criminalise. She argued that the law should signal to hackers that unauthorised access was not 
acceptable.138 Hence, it could be interpreted as an absolute condemnation of all forms of 
hacking. However, the terms of her draft Bill, very similarly to the SLC’s proposal, would 
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have left space for security researchers acting with reasonable care to explore and test a 
security system. They could also have possessed hacking tools in the absence of further intent 
to commit crime.  
 
 
How this Bill was received is difficult to tell, in the absence of discussions before Parliament. 
Two lawyers argued in favour of the non-criminalisation of security researchers, one noting 
their vital role of assisting the police in the fight against cybercrime.139 Peter Sommer, alias 
Hugo Cornwall, an ‘Oxford-trained lawyer’ and expert in digital forensics, considered that 
the Bill’s objectives were misaligned with the reality of hacking. The Bill did not tackle real 
issues such as system owners’ lax security practices, theft of information or the difficulties in 
using computer files as evidence.140 Yet, Sommer also recognised it had become impossible 
to talk of hacking as an educational challenge as he did in 1985 when quoted by the SLC in 
its 1986 report.141 The context had changed. In November 1988, the Morris worm brought 
down much of the internet. Hacking had become a controversial activity which had to be 
criminalised 142. 
 
Nicholson withdrew her Bill in July 1989 on the promise that the Government would present 
one once the ELC had published its final report.143 In effect, the Bill’s withdrawal signalled 
the end of the idea of exempting hackers from criminal liability, even if they hacked for 
security purposes and did so responsibly, with reasonable care. The ELC became adamant 
that security researchers should also be criminalised. 
 
 
 
3.4 - The final decision to criminalise security researchers 
 
By the time the ELC published its final report in October 1989 its approach to hacking had 
changed dramatically, influenced by the surrounding context. The tone and discourse about 
hacking had changed dramatically during the year 1989. Comments widely called for the 
criminalisation of hacking without exceptions, with barely a mention of the Law 
Commissions’ other proposals or of Nicholson’s Bill.144. Behind this change in tone lies a 
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transformation in the reality of hacking. Motivated by greed and power, hackers stopped 
being mostly security researchers.145  
The initial hacking culture and mindset of expanding one’s knowledge of IT systems 
to improve security had not disappeared but it was superseded by the image of the ‘black 
hat’, the criminal hacker.146 Hacking became associated solely with crime, pushing aside the 
idea that security researchers could act responsibly. 
 
 
Therefore, the ELC expressly rejected Nicholson’s Bill, as well as the SLC’s 1987 
proposal.147 The entire report was a condemnation of hacking, including for the purpose of 
security: ‘the hacker who genuinely was merely (unauthorised) testing the system’s defences 
would still in our view be someone whom the law should seek to discourage’.148 For the 
ELC, the mischief that criminal law should tackle was not that which the ELC and SLC 
previously identified: the invasion of privacy, and the damage the hacker could inflict.149 It 
was instead that attempts by unknown hackers to secure unauthorised access breach the 
integrity of an IT system, ‘whatever the motive behind those attempts’.150 
 Therefore, the offence of unauthorised access, which was to become s1 CMA 1990, 
‘seeks to catch those who actively interfere with the system itself, in order to inspect its 
contents or test its access procedures’151. This would prohibit both the exploration that 
precedes gaining access - when the hacker tries to gain access through various methods - and 
the exploration that follows the gaining of unauthorised access, even if done with reasonable 
care and without an intention to commit crime. The offence would also, through accessorial 
liability, prohibit the use of bulletin boards when the publication of information would 
facilitate hacking by criminals.152  
 
Due to time constraints the ELC did not draft a Bill but its conclusions were widely 
accepted.153 In the absence of a government Bill MP Colvin, having obtained the 
government’s support, deposited a Private Member’s Bill in December 1989 along the same 
lines outlined by the ELC in 1989.154 His Bill became the Computer Misuse Act.  
 
 
 
3.5 – Lessons from the past 
 
Although not identical, the Law Commissions’ proposals and Nicholson’s Bill had clear 
advantages. They did not focus on (un)authorised access, which is often a contentious issue. 
Instead, they shifted the debate to the proportionality of the security researcher’s actions in 
relation to the objective sought –finding a vulnerability. Both Law Commissions made 
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several references to hacking as a harmless pursuit. Nevertheless, the structure of their 
recommended offences indicated that hacking could cause two types of harms without 
systematically attracting criminal liability. These harms were invasion of privacy, as a breach 
of confidentiality, and damage to IT systems, a breach of integrity. 
 The proposals did not provide a blank cheque for hackers to do as they pleased, as the 
ELC acknowledged a year later in its 1989 report. The discovery stage would have been legal 
providing the hacker took reasonable care and did not intend to cause damage. The proposals 
would also have constrained the verification process and choice of disclosure. Since the 
hacker could not take advantage of his findings, s/he would have had to disclose to the 
vendor only, and not to the public or on bulletin boards, so as not to damage another’s 
interest. In addition, the security researcher would have had to disclose to the vendor without 
intent to be financially rewarded by the vendor as this could have been interpreted as 
‘procuring himself an advantage’.  
Implicitly, the proposals recognised that a security researcher and a criminal hacker 
might behave very similarly at the discovery stage but that further actions would allow for 
distinguishing between them. Both would initially inspect data or programs and gain 
unauthorised access but the criminal hacker would then move, for example, to writing a virus 
or worm program, whilst the security researcher would inform the vendor in order for the 
vulnerability to be fixed. 
 
 
Suitable for security researchers, the proposals had one weakness though. They would not 
have protected vendors well enough against criminal hackers until it was too late. For the 
ELC, in 1989, the breach of integrity which hacking created justified the criminalisation of 
both criminal hackers and security researchers. The testing the security of the systems should 
be a decision left to the ‘operators’, who would alone grant authorisation to do so.155  
Thirty years later, the development of vulnerability markets, unforeseen in 1989, 
shows that the ELC’s conclusion to leave to vendors alone the finding of vulnerabilities was 
mistaken. Vendors themselves acknowledge the need for independent security researchers to 
search for vulnerabilities without having obtained prior permission to do so. Security 
researchers should be able to hack. On the other hand, today, in the age of cybercrime as a 
service, the ELC’s 1989 assessment about the need to protect systems against breaches of 
integrity has increased, not decreased, in relevance.156 Exempting security researchers from 
criminal liability, by restricting the scope of the unauthorised access offence, is likely to give 
criminal hackers too much freedom to investigate IT systems and too much incentive to 
remain undetected until they can cause damage and feel the full weight of criminal law. As a 
matter of policy it is important that criminal law recognises this harm to the vendor. 
 
 
The question is thus how the law should be drafted to reconcile two opposite objectives: 
protecting vendors and thus tackling criminal hackers’ activities before they commit further 
crimes; allowing security researchers to find and report vulnerabilities without vendors’ prior 
authorisation. Both at international and national levels, the question appears only in the 
margin of the discussions on cybercrime. Yet, in the UK, criminal law’s impact on security 
research has significantly intensified since the original CMA was enacted in 1990. Driven by 
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compliance with the Cybercrime Convention in 2006, and the EU Directive 2013/40/EC in 
2015, the reforms of the CMA in 2006 and in 2015 have increased the penalties for existing 
offences, extended the scope of s3 CMA, and created two new offences: in 2006, the new 
offence of making and distributing hacking tools of s3A CMA, which scope was extended in 
2015; and in 2015, the s3ZA offence when the systems targeted are those of critical 
infrastructures, and to which is attached a penalty of life imprisonment. Thus, security 
researchers in the UK face criminal liability for a range of offences not limited to 
unauthorised access and three months imprisonment as the ELC initially envisaged. Any 
reform of the law would have to take into account this changed landscape. The problem is 
that so far, the discussions on security researchers’ criminal liability at international and 
national levels have been sporadic and restricted to essentially one offence, that of misuse of 
hacking tools, with at times some debates on the structure of unauthorised access. 
 
 
Regarding the misuse of hacking tools offence, the Council of Europe attempted to qualm the 
concerns of the security industry by adding an interpretation clause in Article 6(2).157 Article 
6 should not ‘be interpreted as imposing criminal liability […when the tools are used’ for 
authorised testing or protection of a computer system’. Such a clause did not find its way into 
UK law when the UK created its s3A CMA in 2006. It was not adopted either in the EU 
Directive 2013/40. To protect security researchers, the EU only excluded possession of 
hacking tools and passwords from the scope of criminalisation, reiterating in its Recital 16 
that a specific intent to commit crime must be proven. At national level, s3A CMA has been 
criticised, in particular s3A(2) CMA. A reverse burden of proof has been proposed.158 
However, the proposal still focuses on whether the defendant has or not committed the 
elements of the offence, which is precisely what is difficult to prove. In addition, it ignores 
the other legal challenges security researchers face, notably liability for s1 CMA. 
 
 
Regarding unauthorised access, at international level, how to structure the offence of 
unauthorised access to protect security researchers has been at times discussed. The Council 
of Europe acknowledged that some Member States have rejected the criminalisation of mere 
access when ‘acts of hacking have led to the detection of loopholes and weaknesses of the 
security of systems’.159 The Convention itself offers the options to restrict unauthorised 
access when security measures are infringed and/or when the defendant has intent to obtain 
computer data or other dishonest intent.160 Whether these options would avoid criminalisation 
of security research has not been articulated by the Council of Europe.  
The first option is unlikely to exempt security researchers from criminal liability. 
Vulnerabilities do not necessarily correspond to a system being openly accessible, with no 
security policy implemented.161 Thus finding vulnerabilities may still lead security 
researchers to infringe security measures. Adopting this restriction will not protect security 
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researchers. In addition, it is likely not to protect vendors either. As Freitas demonstrated, 
systems and their owners deserve protection even if systems owners fail to implement 
adequate security measures.162 In that sense, that the EU Directive 2013/40 has introduced it 
as a mandatory element to its Article 3 offence of illegal access remains problematic. 
The second option in the Cybercrime Convention, not present in the EU Directive, 
may be more appropriate. Security researchers do not aim to obtain computer data other than 
the data describing the vulnerability. They may access confidential data, but they would not 
keep and use this data for illegal purposes. Thus the second option could be worded to protect 
security researchers. It is not dissimilar to the Law Commissions’ proposals of 1987 and 
1988, of not criminalising unauthorised access where the hacker has showed no dishonest 
intent to procure an advantage for oneself. Like these past proposals, its main flaw is that 
vendors would not be protected against criminal hackers until it was too late. In any case, the 
UK has not envisaged any of the two options in the Cybercrime Convention, and the 
mandatory restriction established by the EU Directive. Like many member states, the UK is 
not alone in having kept the broader offence of unauthorised access. 163  
 
 
Interestingly, during the drafting of the Directive 2013/40/EU, two MEPs proposed in an 
amendment to Article 3 in order to grant to security researchers what one of the MEPs named 
‘whistleblower protection’.164 The offence would have been committed only when ‘the 
operator or vendor of the system is not fully informed of the vulnerability in a timely 
manner’. Effectively, the proposal incorporated the practice of responsible disclosure as an 
objective element to exempt security researchers from criminal liability. It was a step in the 
right direction. However, the proposal would not have resolved other legal challenges 
security researchers may face. Even if disclosure to vendor and operator has been timely, 
security researchers may still be liable as accessories to unauthorised access if they 
subsequently choose to disclose to the public because the vendor has failed to fix the 
vulnerability timely disclosed. Modifying the offence of unauthorised access is thus not 
sufficient to protect security researchers from criminal liability; no more than modifying the 
offence of misuse of hacking tools is. 
 
A more holistic approach is needed, that embraces all the cybercrime offences security 
researchers may be liable for. Furthermore, two competing interests need to be balanced: that 
to find vulnerabilities, security researchers may breach the confidentiality and integrity of the 
systems criminal law aims to protect; that vendors need protection from criminal hackers. 
The Law Commissions’ past proposals attempted to establish a balance through the structure 
of the offence of unauthorised access. Their main weakness was that by allowing exploration 
of the systems, criminal hackers would also escape criminal liability. Structuring the offence 
of unauthorised access proved equally difficult at international level. The options offered by 
the Cybercrime Convention, even if the UK were to adopt them, as well as the EU Directive 
restrictive definition of unauthorised access would not provide sufficient protection to 
security researchers.  
 A first step could be the use of vulnerability disclosure policies from vendors in order 
to set the boundaries for acceptable hacking, but, as Mangham illustrated, they also have their 
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limits. Could the use of prosecutorial guidelines filter cases so that independent security 
researcher would not be prosecuted? Or would a public interest defence be more appropriate? 
 
 
 
 
4 – Choosing an appropriate response: the proposal of a defence for hacking 
 
To reduce criminal law’s impact in the UK, and in other jurisdictions, ENISA suggested 
drafting prosecutorial guidelines along the lines of the Dutch model implemented in 2013 so 
that all stakeholders would understand how prosecutorial authorities would exercise their 
discretion to prosecute security researchers.165 The suitability of these guidelines needs to be 
assessed before sketching the benefits of a public interest defence. 
 
 
4.1 – The suitability of prosecutorial guidelines 
 
Resorting to prosecutorial guidelines is not a new idea. The OECD 1986 report on 
cybercrime had already recommended not prosecuting security researchers in the presence of 
the following two elements: the security researchers’  ‘inten[t] to improve data security’,  and 
their ‘immediate notice of [the] access and of the loopholes used in the data system to the 
victim or to state authorities’.166 
 
In the UK the Crown Prosecution Service issued some guidelines on prosecution for CMA 
offences in late December 2007. The guidelines followed the CMA reform of 2006 by the 
Police and Justice Act. They aimed to fulfil the government’s promise during the 2006 
parliamentary debates to quell concerns about unwarranted prosecution of security 
researchers for making, distributing or obtaining hacking tools as per the new section 3A 
CMA.  
The guidelines set out a series of questions as a test for deciding to prosecute. 
Criticised at the time of publication by security researchers and academics,167 their 
effectiveness remains difficult to gauge. In R v Mangham the defendant was charged under 
s3A CMA, in addition to s1 and s3 CMA, but he refused to plead guilty for the s3A CMA 
offence. The reasons for the refusal were not provided and it could be speculated that 
Mangham used the guidelines to demonstrate that he did not commit the offence. However, 
the fact remains that the guidelines failed to stop the prosecution for s3A CMA, even though 
the final decision was to lie the charge on file. This could be indicative of the difficulties of 
relying on guidelines to avoid the threat of prosecution. Furthermore, the guidelines on 
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security researchers only concern s3A CMA. Certainly, the DPP needs to consider the public 
interest in prosecution as a general rule but the absence of guidance as to how this public 
interest plays for security researchers accused of committing s1, s3 and s3ZA CMA may 
prove difficult to articulate, as Mangham partially suggests. Thus, could the gaps be filled by 
adopting the model ENISA suggested in 2015? 
 
 
The Dutch prosecutorial guidance emerged after two high-profiles incidents in 2011. 
Academics who had unveiled serious vulnerabilities in the Dutch public-transport chip card 
were investigated for violating the Dutch Computer Misuse Act. To avoid similar situations 
arising the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) issued guidance for both vendors 
and security researchers on responsible disclosure policy in 2013. The policies are far more 
detailed than Facebook’s 2010 policy in Mangham, although the NCSC recognises that they 
cannot be too prescriptive. The NCSC did not act in isolation. The Dutch Ministry of Security 
and Justice publicised the guidance168 and the Dutch prosecutorial authority published its own 
guidance.169  
 
The terms of the prosecutorial guidelines illustrate this concerted approach. The test for 
prosecution strongly echoes the terms of vulnerability disclosure policies that the NCSC 
promoted and by which the vendor authorises the security researcher to hack providing 
his/her actions remain proportionate.  
The Dutch prosecutorial guidelines contain the following three-part test: were the 
security researcher’s actions necessary within a democratic society (general interest)? Were 
the actions proportionate to the goal to be achieved? Could the security researcher have taken 
other possible courses of action that were less intrusive?170 In particular, the security 
researcher should not use brute force attacks or compromise further the security of the 
system; s/he should also avoid copying, modifying or deleting files, the alternative, whenever 
possible, being to create a directory listing for the system as proof of concept of the 
vulnerability.171 In other words, the prosecutorial test looks at how independent security 
researchers can achieve an objective of public interest and how their activities are 
proportionate to the objective sought. The effect is to set limits on security researchers’ 
activities whilst carving a space for security researchers to find vulnerabilities without undue 
fear of criminal prosecution. In this sense the test strongly echoes the structure of the 
proposed offences of unauthorised access in the SLC 1987 draft Bill, the ELC’s 1988 options 
B and C and Nicholson’s 1989 Bill. 
 
 
How effective the test has been in reducing investigations has not been documented so far. 
The effect of the NCSC guidance has been to increase the number of organisations publishing 
their disclosure policies and ‘paying attention to the legal implications’ of their policy in light 
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of the prosecutorial guidelines.172 In this sense, the coordinated approach of good 
vulnerability disclosure policies and prosecutorial guidelines could be said to be effective. It 
would probably be suitable for the UK CPS to adopt a similar approach. Strong guidelines 
would potentially help hackers such as Mangham, who are on the autism spectrum.173 
 
 
However, for the security researcher, prosecutorial guidelines may not suffice to significantly 
reduce the risk of criminal liability. They should decrease the risk of prosecution. However, if 
the prosecution authority nevertheless decides to go ahead there is uncertainty as to whether 
the security researcher could rely on prosecutorial guidelines and/or on the vulnerability 
disclosure policy to convince the judge s/he is not guilty of having committed computer 
misuse offences.  
As per Cuthbert, the structure of the CMA offences, especially of s1 CMA, does not 
allow for integrating the proportionality of the security researcher’s actions into the analysis 
of the actus reus. The motive of public interest cannot be taken into account either as part of 
the mens rea. Arguably, in Cuthbert no prosecutorial guidelines existed but Cuthbert was 
leading one of the key organisations in the process of establishing standards in security 
research. Although it is unclear from the news reports whether he referred to these standards 
in Court he chose to plead not guilty, thus arguing he should not be convicted. Yet, he was 
unable to convince the judge not to find him guilty despite the judge regretting the 
conviction. Whether prosecutorial guidelines would have changed the situation is unclear.  
 
At a more practical level it is also uncertain whether the security researcher would feel 
confident enough to challenge before the court the prosecutorial interpretation that his/her 
actions were illegal. Mangham explained he felt compelled to plead guilty to most charges.174 
Yet, this paper demonstrated that most of his actions could be considered compliant with 
Facebook’s vulnerability disclosure policy. Again, no prosecutorial guidelines existed but, 
given that the suggested guidelines put forward criteria essentially similar to those of 
vulnerability disclosure policies, would Mangham have felt able to challenge before a judge 
both the vendor’s and the prosecution’s interpretation of the facts and law?   
Put differently, prosecutorial guidelines are strongly desirable because security 
researchers can read them and understand better the boundaries of legal and illegal actions. 
However, in the event that security researchers are prosecuted, guidelines would still leave 
uncertainty as to whether the security researchers could demonstrate to the court that they did 
not commit CMA offences. A public interest defence would enable security researchers to 
argue the proportionality of their actions with regard to the public interest they have pursued. 
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4.2 – Sketching a public interest defence 
 
In the last thirty years sole reliance on vendors’ willingness to improve the security of their 
systems, as advocated by the ELC in 1989, has failed to significantly contribute to the 
security of IT systems. If prosecuted, security researchers need a mechanism to discuss 
before the courts the implications of their work and the methods used. To do so at mitigation 
stage does not suffice. When sentenced, security researchers are left with a criminal record 
and are likely to spend some time in prison. A mechanism needs to allow security researchers 
to demonstrate that they acted in the public interest and proportionately, so that they could be 
found not guilty. 
 Article 6 of the Cybercrime Convention represented a first step in this direction. It 
allowed parties to criminalise the creation, distribution and possession of hacking tools but 
indicated in Article 6(2) that the courts should not interpret the provisions to impose criminal 
liability on security researchers. However, Article 6(2) only concerns one offence, in the UK 
that of section 3A CMA. Furthermore, it does not articulate what the courts should take into 
account. 
 
 
In contrast, available to all CMA offences, the defence, which could be called as a short-hand 
a defence for hacking, would give a statutory basis for discussing before the courts what 
constitutes technically and ethically responsible vulnerability research. It would take stock of 
vendors’ understandable reluctance to authorise violations of integrity whilst recognising that 
independent security researchers can undertake work of public interest under certain 
conditions. 
Its terms could mirror the prosecutorial guidelines that the UK could implement as 
suggested above, as well as the current terms of many bug bounty programmes and 
vulnerability disclosure policies. The focus would stop being on whether the vendor has or 
has not authorised hacking. Instead, the discussion would shift to the proportionality of the 
security researchers’ actions and the public interest in vulnerability research. 
 
 
The defence could be integrated into a more coherent legal and technical framework for the 
security researcher. A CMA amendment would bring to light government practices of buying 
vulnerabilities from independent security researchers. It would push for a debate on whether 
governments should do so and, if so, how they and security researchers selling to them should 
be regulated.175 
 Furthermore, because security researchers are akin at times to whistle-blowers,176 the 
defence would provide additional momentum to re-examine a public interest defence for 
journalists and whistle-blowers. Such defence for journalists has already been raised in 
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1989/1990, suggested in the Leveson inquiry,177 and discussed in Parliament in 2014 before 
an amendment to the CMA was withdrawn.178 In 2015, former DPP Keir Starmer has called 
for journalists to benefit from a public interest defence for a variety of offences among which 
the CMA offences. He felt that the prosecutorial guidelines for the media –drafted when he 
was DPP- were insufficient to protect journalists in difficult cases.179 Similar arguments 
could be put forward for security researchers, although there are differences between security 
researchers reporting vulnerabilities and journalists writing, for example, on tax evasion as in 
the Paradise papers. Whereas journalists may report on wrongdoing, security researchers are 
unlikely to report on others’ activities that would be illegal per se. As demonstrated, even if 
good security were to be systematically part of products’ design, vulnerabilities would remain 
and would have to be discovered. Public interest in security research does not lie necessarily 
in the interest of the public to be informed of vulnerabilities, but on security researchers being 
able to investigate and report vulnerabilities to vendors without fear of prosecution. 
 
 
 
5 - Conclusion 
 
This paper outlined the existing tensions between the public interest in security researchers 
engaging in vulnerability research and the legal challenges they currently face along the three 
phases of vulnerability research – discovery, verification and disclosure-. This paper then 
proceeded to demonstrate that three options could be available with regards to criminal 
law.180  
 
The first option would be to modify the structure of the CMA offences, notably the offence of 
unauthorised access, along the lines that the Scottish and English Law Commissions 
proposed in 1987 and 1988. Their choice was to legalise unauthorised access when the hacker 
took reasonable care not to damage the computer system and did not intentionally act to gain 
an advantage for himself or for another. This was a significant step forward. Security 
researchers would have avoided criminal liability whilst being constrained in their actions, 
notably at the verification and disclosure stage. Yet it had serious drawbacks which have not 
faded over the years as the discussions on the structure of these offences in the Cybercrime 
Convention and in the EU Directive 2013/40/EU have demonstrated. Should these past 
proposals be implemented criminal law would be unable to send the important signal that 
malicious hackers should not hack and that public interest also lies in protecting the integrity 
of vendors’ IT systems.  
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The second option would be to modify the CPS current guidelines along the lines of the 
Dutch model, as suggested by ENISA in 2015. This would require a concerted approach 
between the CPS and the UK equivalent of the Dutch National Cybersecurity Centre. 
Vendors would be pushed to adopt best practices in drafting vulnerability disclosure policies 
that outlined the obligations of all stakeholders, not just the security researchers. Better 
drafted policies and prosecutorial guidelines could even contribute to reducing the risk of 
prosecution for hackers on the autism spectrum, who are disproportionally represented in 
hacking cases. Nevertheless, this option does not provide certainty as to what security 
researchers could argue before the courts should they be prosecuted.   
 
Thus, this paper proposed a third option: creating a public interest defence for the security 
researcher. The tension between the public interest in security researchers finding 
vulnerabilities and the private interests of the vendors in protecting the integrity of their IT 
systems is only apparent. They are two sides of the same coin: the fight against cybercrime. 
Thus, the defence would allow independent security researchers to take an active part in the 
fight against cybercrime, to the benefit of the wider public. Finally, a defence would fit 
within the wider debate on whether journalists and whistle-blowers would benefit from a 
public interest defence for hacking.  
 
 
